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1Introduction
One of the important goals in computational cryptography is to provide apublic-key encryption
(PKE) scheme that achieves asecurity level as strong as possible under various circumstances.
To this end, we have to carefully define “security” of the PKE schemes. Satisfactory definitions
of security of PKE schemes were presented by Goldwasser and Micali [13]. One is called semantic
security and the other is called polynomial secur$r\cdot ty$ (a.k.a. indistinguishability (of ciphertext)).
Yet another security goal non-malleability was introduced by Dolev, Dwork and Naor [8]. Attack
models besides security goals were invented in the literature [18, 19, 10]. Nowadays, each security
notion is defined in terms of aparticular security goal and aparticular attack model. Relations
among security notions are being organized well [13, 16, 1, 3].
The major three attack models are chosen plaintext attack (CPA), non-adaptive chosen
ciphertext attack (CCAI), and adaptive chosen cipher text attack (CCA2). The adversary under
CPA can obtain ciphertexts of plaintext of his choice. Since, in the public-key setting, giving
the adversary the public key suffices to capture the attack, CPA is considered passive attack.
On the other hand, the other attack models are called active attack. Under CCAI, due to
Naor and Yung [18], the adversary gets, in addition to the public key, access to an oracle for
the decryption function. The adversary may invoke this oracle before being given the challenge
ciphertext $c$ . Under CCA2, due to Rackoff and Simon [19], the adversary gets, in addition to the
public key, access to the decryption oracle, but this time he may invoke the decryption oracle
even on ciphertexts chosen after obtaining the challenge ciphertext $c$ , the only restriction being
that the adversary may not ask for the decryption of $c$ itself.
While non-malleability against CCA2 (NM-CCA2) is considered the most secure notion of
PKE schemes, some PKE schemes actually achieve the security of NM-CCA2. Most of them
are proved to have the security of NM-CCA2 in the random oracle model due to Bellare and
Rogaway [2]. As the results in [6] say, the use of the random oracle model is controversial,
though it brings anice methodology to design PKE schemes. On the other hand, Cramer and
Shoup [7] proposed an efficient PKE scheme with the security of NM-CCA2. They proved it
not on the random oracle model but on the assumption the existence of afamily of universal
Oneway hash functions (UOWHF) and the hardness of the Decision Diffie-Hellman problem.
Furthermore, in the sense that no PKE schemes without the random oracle model or UOWHF
is known so far, the security notion of NM-CCA2 is an exceedingly strong notion.
As we call both CCAI and CCA2 “active” attacks, they are quite powerful. Before Ble-
ichenbacher [4] showed away to utilize active attacks to crack PKCS#I, active attacks had
been considered impractical. However, the attack by Bleichenbacher is realized by afraction of
the power of chosen ciphertext attack. Moreover, though some separation results between secu-
rity notions with respect to chosen ciphertext attack were shown [1], the separation results were
caused by the abuse of abad implementation of the decryption function in the PKE scheme. In
the practical setting, it is hard to consider the existence of the bad implementation (of the de-
cryption function) that, given an unexpected input, outputs the secret key. We can say that the
current definitions of chosen ciphertext attack are somewhat unfit for the practical discussion.
In this paper, we introduce finer definitions of chosen ciphertext attack. We consider three
types of chosen ciphertext attack: (1) Type $\alpha$ oracle answers whether agiven string is alegitimate
ciphertext or not. (2) Type $\beta$ oracle, given alegitimate ciphertext, answers the corresponding
plaintext; If he is asked for astring that is not alegitimate ciphertext then he replies with $”[perp]$ ”
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that means undefined. (3) Type 7oracle, given alegitimate ciphertext, answers the correspond-
ing plaintext; If he is asked for astring that is not alegitimate ciphertext then he modifies the
return value from the decryption algorithm and replies with the modified return value. We note
that chosen ciphertext attack of type $\alpha$ is enough to express the Bleichenbacher’s attack in [4].
We also note that the original chosen ciphertext attack is similar to the chosen ciphertext attack
of type 7and the oracle of type $\gamma$ may reply with the secret key.
Moreover we refine relations among security notions and consider what properties of chosen
ciphertext attack is essential for the separation and the implication of security notions with
respect to chosen ciphertext attack. Though complexity theoretic research for PKE schemes so
far has been focused mainly on security notions under CPA (e.g., [5, 9, 22, 14, 12]), we also
consider security notions against chosen ciphertext attack ffom the viewpoint of computational
complexity theory.
2Preliminaries
This section provides formal definitions of security notions for public-key encryption (PKE)
schemes. We use standard notations and conventions for writing probabilistic algorithms and
experiments. If $A$ is aprobabilistic algorithm, then $A(x_{1},x_{2}, \ldots; r)$ is the result of running $A$
on inputs $x_{1}$ , $x_{2}$ , $\ldots$ and coins $r$ . We let $yarrow A(x_{1}, x_{2}, \ldots)$ denote the experiment of choosing
$r$ randomly and uniformly and letting $y$ be $A(x_{1}, x_{2}, \ldots; r)$ . We let $\sup(A(x_{1}, x_{2}, \ldots))=\{y$ :
$\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[yarrow A(x_{1},x_{2}, \ldots)]\geq 0\}$ . If $S$ is afinite set then $xarrow S$ is the operation of choosing an element
uniformly ffom $S$ . If $a$ is neither an algorithm nor aset then $xarrow a$ is asimple assignment
statement.
Apublic-key encryption scheme VKS $=(\mathcal{K},\mathcal{E}, \mathrm{V})$ consists of three algorithms $\mathcal{K}$, $\mathcal{E}$ and 7),
where
$\bullet$
$\mathcal{K}$ , the key generation algorithm, is aprobabilistic algorithm that inputs the unary expres-
sion of asecurity parameter $k\in \mathrm{N}$ and outputs apair $(pk, sk)$ of the public key and the
secret key.
$\bullet$
$\mathcal{E}$ , the encryption algorithm, is aprobabilistic algorithm that, given apublic key $pk$ and a
plaintext $m\in M_{k}$ , outputs aciphertext $c$ , where $M_{k}$ is amessage space. Without loss of
generality we assume that $M_{k}\subseteq\{0,1\}^{k}$ .
\bullet D, the decryption algorithm, is adeterministic algorithm that, given asecret key sk and
aciphertext c, outputs aplaintext m $\in M_{k}$ .
We require that for all $(pk, sk)$ which can be output by $\mathcal{K}(1^{k})$ and, for all $c$ such that $c=\mathcal{E}_{pk}(m)$
for some $m$ , we have that $D_{sk}(c)=m$ . We also require that $\mathcal{K}$ , $\mathcal{E}$ and 7) can be computed in
polynomial time. We sometimes an additional property on PKE schemes as follows.
\bullet The decryption algorithm 7), given asecret key and anon-ciphertext, outputs aspecial
symbol $”[perp]$”to indicate that the ciphertext is invalid.
We call the above property invalidity checkable property. Acutally, many PKE schemes of the
NM-CCA2 security satisfy the “invalidity checkable (IC)” property. We note that, in general,
the IC property is not requisite for PKE schemes. However, we will show that the IC property
affects the security of PKE schemes through this paper.
Afunction $\epsilon$ : $\mathrm{N}arrow \mathbb{R}$ is said to be negligible if for every constant $c\geq 0$ there exists
an integer $k_{c}$ such that $\epsilon(k)\leq k^{-c}$ for all $k\geq k_{c}$ . We let $C$ (w.r.t. $P\mathcal{K}\mathcal{E}$ ) denote the set
{($pk$ , $c$) : $c=\mathcal{E}_{pk}(m)$ for some $m\in M_{k}$ , $pk \in\sup(\mathcal{K}(1^{k}))$ (and some coins $r)$ }. We call the set
$C$ ciphertext space (w.r.t. $P\mathcal{K}\mathcal{E}$).
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2.1 Attack Models
In this paper, we refine definitions of chosen ciphertext attack. Before giving them, we review
attack models so far. We regard an adversary $A$ as apair of probabilistic algorithms $A=$
$(A_{1}, A_{2})$ . This corresponds to $A$ running in two stages. In the first stage, the adversary, given
the public key, seeks and output some “test instance” and some additional information. In the
second stage, the adversary is handed achallenge ciphertext $c$ that is generated as afunction of
the test instance and tries to achieve the goal.
First, we consider basic three types of attack models.
$\bullet$ In chosen plaintext attack (CPA), the adversary can encrypt plaintexts of his choice. CPA
is passive attack in asense that he also knows the public key and can compute aciphertext
for any plaintext he desires.
$\bullet$ In non-adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (CCAI), $A_{1}$ can access to the public key and a
decryption oracle, but $A_{2}$ is not allowed to access to adecryption oracle.
$\bullet$ In adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (CCA2), $A_{1}$ can access to the public key and a
decryption oracle, but also $A_{2}$ can access to the same decryption oracle, with the only
restriction that he cannot ask the oracle for the challenge ciphertext $c$ .
Now, we consider what we mean by “decryption oracl\"e. It is literally an oracle that, given
aciphertext, lets us know the corresponding plaintext. Literalism itself for decryption oracle
does not tell us the action of the oracle when the oracle is given anon-ciphertext. Most common
interpretation is that the oracle, given anon-ciphertext, can reply with any string that can be
output by the decryption algorithm. We note that the decryption oracle may reply with “secret
key” !This is one of the broadest interpretation and brings us the strongest attack model. Here,
we stress that we use “decryption oracle” and “decryption algorithm” in different terminologies.
When we say “decryption algorithm” , we mean that it is just apolynomial-time algorithm to
decrypt ciphertexts. On the other hand, when we say “decryption oracl\"e, me mean that it
is exploited by the adversary. Thus, “decryption oracle” also exploits “decryption algorithm”
as the need arises. Moreover, we may assume that “decryption oracle” has super-polynomially
computational power.
Adecryption algorithm (without the IC property) is an implementation of the decryption
function, which may be apartial function. Any partial function has its domain and the functional
value of some element not in the domain is usually “undefined”. However, any functionally
honest implementation (algorithm) of the decryption function should not let the secret key out
carelessly even when any non-ciphertext is given to the algorithm. In some practical setting, a
decryption algorithm may have aside effect such as “debug mode.” Some decryption algorithm
with debug mode may be functionally dishonest. On the other hand, any decryption algorithm
of aPKE scheme with the IC property must be functionally honest.
Now, we are ready to prescribe the action of decryption oracle. We consider three types of
decryption oracle as follows:
New chosen ciphertext attacks are defined in terms of the decryption oracle of the above
types. We describe the chosen ciphertext attacks more precisely.
$\bullet$ In adaptive chosen ciphertext attack of type $\alpha$ ( $\alpha$-CCA2), $A_{1}$ can access to the public key
and adecryption oracle of type $\alpha$ , but also $A_{2}$ can access to the same decryption oracle,
with only restriction that he cannot ask the oracle for the challenge ciphertext $c$ . Only
information that both $A_{1}$ and $A_{2}$ can obtain from the decryption oracle is whether query
strings are ciphertexts or not. We note that the restriction on A2’s oracle queries actually
does not influence on the security, because the membership information of the challenge
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its plaintext $[perp](\mathrm{u}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}fi \mathrm{n}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d})$
its plaintext modification of the retum value
ffom the decryption algorithm
Table 1: What decryption oracle replies with?
ciphertext is supposed. We also note that deciding whether given strings are ciphertext
or not may be beyond the polynomial computation. Nevertheless, we assume that, in
this model, the decryption oracle of tyPe $\alpha$ can compute the membership exactly. In case
of PKE schemes with the IC property, the membership is decidable in polynomial time,
since the decryption algorithm (with the IC property) also can compute the membership
in polynomial time. As long as we consider the PKE schemes with the IC property, the
existence of the decryption oracle of type $\alpha$ is naturally assumed.
$\bullet$ In adaptive chosen ciphertext attack of type $\beta$ ($\beta$-CCA2), $A_{1}$ can access to the public
key and adecryption oracle of type $\beta$ , but also A2 can access to the same decryption
oracle, with only restriction that he cannot ask the oracle for the challenge ciphertext $c$ .
Whenever $A_{1}$ and A2 query the decryption oracle of tyPe $\beta$ with ciphertext, they can obtain
the corresponding plaintext. On the other hand, whenever $A_{1}$ and A2 query the decryption
oracle of type $\beta$ with non-ciphertext, only information that they can obtain is the fact that
the query string is just anon-ciphertext. In case of $\beta$-CCA2, the restriction on $A_{2}’ \mathrm{s}$ oracle
queries are essential. Moreover, deciding whether given strings are ciphertext or not may
be beyond the polynomial computation. Nevertheless, we also assume that, in this model,
the decryption oracle of type $\beta$ can compute the membership exactly. In addition, we
assume that the decryption oracle, given aciphertext, can reply with the corresponding
plaintext. In case of PKE schemes with the IC property, computation that the decryption
oracle of type $\beta$ performs is of polynomial-time, since the decryption algorithm (with the
IC property) also can compute it in polynomial time. As long as we consider the PKE
schemes with the IC property, the existence of the decryption oracle of type $\beta$ is naturally
assumed.
$\bullet$ In adaptive chosen ciphertext attack of tyPe $\gamma$ ($\gamma$-CCA2), $A_{1}$ can access to the public key
and decryption oracle of type 7, but also A2 can access to the same decryption oracle, with
only restriction that he cannot ask the oracle for the challenge ciphertext $c$ . Whenever
$A_{1}$ and A2 query the decryption oracle of tyPe $\gamma$ with ciphertext, they can obtain the
corresponding plaintext. On the other hand, whenever $A_{1}$ and A2 query the decryption
oracle of tyPe $\gamma$ with non-ciphertext, the oracle exploits the decryption algorithm. Namely,
the oracle uses the decryption algorithm and obtains some information from the decryption
algorithm. After that, the oracle modifies the information and replies with the modified
information. So, if the decryption algorithm returns, given an unexpected input, some
information, which may be the secret key, then the decryption oracle may reply with
the information. In case of PKE schemes with the IC property, computation that the
decryption oracle of type 7performs is of polynomial-time, since the decryption algorithm
(with the IC property) also can compute it in polynomial time. As long as we consider
the PKE schemes with the IC property, the existence of the decryption oracle of type 7is
naturally assumed.
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We may interpret the action of CCA2 of each type as follows. In CCA2 of any type, the
decryption oracle can access to the membership oracle $\mathcal{L}$ that can answer whether given strings
are ciphertexts or not. Here, the power of $\mathcal{L}$ may be beyond the polynomial computation even
if the secret key is known. (We note that if we consider the PKE schemes with the IC property
then $\mathcal{L}$ can be simulated in polynomial time by using the decryption algorithm.) The decryption
oracle of each type first invokes the membership oracle $\mathcal{L}$ and then acts accordingly. Now, we
assume that $w$ is astring given to the decryption oracle. The decryption oracle of type $\alpha$ replies
with just the return value from the membership oracle C. The decryption oracle of type $\beta$
invokes the decryption “algorithm” if $\mathcal{L}(w)=yes$ , and replies with the return value from the
decryption algorithm. The decryption oracle of type $\beta$ replies with $”[perp]$”if $\mathcal{L}(w)=no$ . The
decryption oracle of type $\gamma$ invokes the decryption “algorithm” if $\mathcal{L}(w)=yes$ , and replies with
the return value from the decryption algorithm. The decryption oracle of type $\gamma$ replies with
$f(D(w))$ if $\mathcal{L}(w)=no$ , where $f$ is apolynomial-time modification. We note that 7-CCA2
whose polynomial modification $f$ is an identical function coincides with the traditional CCA2
regardless of the computational power of $\mathcal{L}$ , because the decryption oracle can be simulated by
the decryption algorithm without the membership oracle C. We also note that $\gamma$ CCA2 whose
polynomial modification $f$ is aconstant function (i.e., $”[perp]”$ ) coincides with 4-CCA2.
We call answer by decryption oracle of type $\gamma$ that is asked for anon-ciphertext dishonest
answer.
We note that the first practical chosen ciphertext attack by Bleichenbacher [4] is of type
$\alpha$ . Although Bellare et $\mathrm{a}l[1]$ worked out the relations among security notions, some separa-
tion results (i.e., NM-CPA $\neq$ IND-CCAI and NM-GCAI $\neq$ NM-CCA2) were shown by using
dishonest answers by decryption oracle of type $\gamma$ .
We have given the definitions of adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (CCA2) of each type. It is
easy to consider the corresponding definitions to non-adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (CCAI)
of each type. Although we omit their description, we let $\alpha$-CCAI denote non-adaptive chosen
ciphertext attack where decryption oracle of type $\alpha$ is available to the adversary. Similarly, we
use notations such that $\beta$-CCAI and $\gamma$-CCAI.
For simplicity, the adversary $A=$ ( $A_{1}$ , A2) for CCA2 consist of the probabilistic algorithms
that invoke decryption oracle of the same type. It is not hard to consider the adversary $A=$
$(A_{1}, A_{2})$ for CCA2 where the type of $A_{1}$ is different from the type of $A_{2}$ . In this paper, we do
not consider the adversary of mixture types.
2.2 Security Goals
2.2.1 Indistinguishability of ciphertext
The notion of indistinguishability of ciphertext (IND) was originally introduced by Goldwasser
and Micali [13]. Here we adopt aversion of this notion by Bellare et $\mathrm{a}l[1]$ .
Algorithm $A_{1}$ is run on input the public key $pk$ and outputs atriple $(m\circ, m_{1}, s)$ , where $s$ is
possible including $pk$ . Let $mb$ is randomly selected from $\{m\circ, m_{1}\}$ . Achallenge $c$ is computed
by encrypting $mb$ using $pk$ . Algorithm A2 tries to guess if $c$ was selected as the ciphertext of
$m\circ$ or $m_{1}$ . To this end, A2 is given the additional information $s$ and the challenge ciphertext $c$ .
Definition 1Let VKS $=(\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{E}, D)$ be aPKE scheme and $C$ be the ciphertext space with respect
to $P\mathcal{K}\mathcal{E}$ and let $A=(A_{1}, A_{2})$ be an adversary. For $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{k}\in\{\mathrm{c}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{a}$, $\alpha$-ccal, $\beta$-ccal, $\gamma$-ccal, $\alpha$-cca2, $\beta$-cca
$\gamma$-cca2}and $k\in \mathrm{N}$ , we let
$\mathrm{A}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{v}^{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}-\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{k}}(k)=\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[\mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{p}^{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}-\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{k}-1}(k)=1]-\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[\mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{p}^{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}-\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{k}-0}(k)=1]$
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where, for $b\in\{0,1\}$ , $\mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{p}^{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}-\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{k}-\mathrm{b}}(k)$ is computed as follows.
(pk,$sk)arrow \mathcal{K}(1^{k});R$ $(m_{0},m_{1}, s)arrow A_{1}^{\mathcal{O}_{1}(\cdot)}(pk)$ ; c $arrow \mathcal{E}_{pk}(m_{b})$ ;
d $arrow A_{2}^{\mathcal{O}_{2}(\cdot)}(m_{0},m_{1},$s,c); output ci,
and
if $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{k}=\mathrm{c}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{a}$ then $O_{1}(\cdot)=\epsilon$ and $\mathrm{O}2(-)=\epsilon$
if $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{k}=t$-ccal, where $t\in\{\alpha,\beta,\gamma\}$ then $O_{1}(\cdot)=D_{sk}^{t}(\cdot)$ and $\mathrm{O}2(-)=\epsilon$
if $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{k}=t$-cca2, where $t\in\{\alpha,\beta,\gamma\}$ then $O_{1}(\cdot)=D_{sk}^{t}(\cdot)$ and $\mathrm{O}2(-)=D_{sk}^{t}(\cdot)$ ,
where $D_{sk}^{\alpha}(w)$ replies with either $w\in C$ or $w\not\in C;D_{sk}^{\beta}(w)=D_{sk}(w)$ only if $w\in C$ and
$D_{sk}^{\beta}(w)=[perp] \mathrm{o}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}$ ; $D_{sk}^{\gamma}(w)=D_{sk}(w)$ only if $w\in C$ and $D_{sk}^{\gamma}(w)=f(D_{sk}(w))$ otherwise,
where $f$ is apolynomial-time modification.
Above it is mandatory that $|m\mathrm{o}|=|m_{1}|$ . In the case of CCA2, we insist that $A_{2}$ does not invoke
its oracle with the challenge ciphertext $c$. We say that $P\mathcal{K}\mathcal{E}$ is secure in the sense of IND-ATK
if $A$ being polynomial-time implies that $\mathrm{A}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{v}^{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}-\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{k}}(\cdot)$ is negligible.
2.2.2 Non-Malleability
The notion of non-malleability (NM) was originally introduced by Dolev, Dwork and Naor [8].
Here we adopt aversion of this notion by Bellare et ai [8].
Let $A=$ ($A_{1}$ ,A2) be an adversary. Algorithm $A_{1}$ , given the public key $pk$ , outputs a
description of amessage space, described by asampling algorithm $M$. The message space must
be valid. Algorithm A2 receives aciphertext of amessage $m_{1}$ drawn ffom M. A2 then tries
to output adescription of arelation $R$ and avector $\vec{c}$ (no component of which is $c$) such that
$R(m,\vec{m})$ holds, where $\vec{m}arrow D_{sk}(\vec{c})$ .
Definition 2Let VKS $=(\mathcal{K},\mathcal{E},D)$ be aPKE scheme and $C$ be the ciphertext space with respect
to VKS and let $A=$ ($A_{1}$ , A2) be an adversary. For $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{k}\in\{\mathrm{c}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{a}$, $\alpha$-ccal, $\beta$-ccal, $\gamma$-ccal, $\mathrm{t}$-cca2, $\beta$-cca2,
$\gamma$-cca2}and $k\in \mathrm{N}$ , we let
$\mathrm{A}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{v}^{\mathrm{n}\mathrm{m}-\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{k}}(k)=\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[\mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{p}^{\mathrm{n}\mathrm{m}-\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{k}-1}(k)=1]-\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[\mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{p}^{\mathrm{n}\mathrm{m}-\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{k}-0}(k)=1]$
where, for $b\in\{0,1\}$ , $\mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{p}^{\mathrm{n}\mathrm{m}-\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{k}-\mathrm{b}}(k)$ is computed as follows.
$(pk, sk)arrow \mathcal{K}(1^{k});R$ $(M, s)arrow A_{1}^{O_{1}(\cdot)}(pk)$ ; $m_{0},m_{1}arrow M$; $carrow \mathcal{E}_{pk}(m_{1})$ ;
$(R, c]$ $arrow A_{2}^{O_{2}(\cdot)}(M, s,c)$ ; $\vec{m}arrow D_{sk}(\overline{c})$ ;
if c $\not\in\vec{c}\wedge[perp]\not\in\vec{m}\wedge R(m_{b},\vec{m})$ then d $arrow 1$ else d $arrow \mathrm{O}$ ; output d,
and
if $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{k}=\mathrm{c}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{a}$ then $O_{1}(\cdot)=\epsilon$ and O2(-) $=\epsilon$
if $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{k}=t$-ccal, where $t\in\{\alpha,\beta,\gamma\}$ then $O_{1}(\cdot)=D_{sk}^{t}(\cdot)$ and $\mathrm{O}2(-)=\epsilon$
if $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{k}=t$-cca2, where $t\in\{\alpha,\beta, \gamma\}$ then $O_{1}(\cdot)=D_{sk}^{t}$ ( $\cdot$ ) and O2(-) $=D_{sk}^{t}(\cdot)$ ,
where $D_{sk}^{\alpha}(w)$ replies with either $w\in C$ or $w\not\in C;D_{sk}^{\beta}(w)=D_{sk}(w)$ only if $w\in C$ and
$D_{sk}^{\beta}(w)=[perp] \mathrm{o}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}$ ; $D_{sk}^{\gamma}(w)=D_{sk}(w)$ only if $w\in C$ and $D_{sk}^{\gamma}(w)=f(D_{sk}(w))$ otherwise,
where $f$ is apolynomial-time modification.
Above it is mandatory that $M$ is valid, namely, $|m|=|m’|$ for any $m$ , $m’$ in supp(M). In the
case of CCA2, we insist that A2 does not invoke its oracle with the challenge ciphertext $c$ . We
say that $P\mathcal{K}\mathcal{E}$ is secure in the sense of NM-ATK if $A$ runs in polynomial time $p(k)$ , outputs a
valid message space $M$ samplable in time $p(k)$ , and outputs arelation $R$ computable in time
$p(k)$ , then $\mathrm{A}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{v}^{\mathrm{n}\mathrm{m}-\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{k}}(\cdot)$ is negligible.
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3Complexity Theoretic Consideration of a-CCA
Before considering the relation among security notions, we consider the power of $\alpha$-CCA2from
the viewpoint of computational complexity theory. In [5], Brassard showed that if the cracking
of aPKE scheme in the sense of one-wayness whose ciphertext space $C$ belongs to coNP
is $\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$-hard then NP $=\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$. Though number theoretic PKE schemes such as the RSA
scheme is prone to being coNP, his claim is not so serious for cryptographic research. After
that, complexity theoretic issues in cryptography have been studied in the literature [9, 22, 14,
12]. Those research is mainly security under $\mathrm{C}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{A}$. In this section, we consider security under
CCA from the viewpoint of computational complexity theory. To this end, we introduce a
deterministic variant of the problem for distinguishing ciphertexts. We let
$D_{0}=\{(pk, c_{0}, c_{1})$ : $c_{0}=\mathcal{E}_{pk}(m)$ , $c_{1}=\mathcal{E}_{pk}(m)$
for some $m\in M_{k}$ and for some $pk\in suw(\mathcal{K}(1^{k}))\}$ ,
$D_{1}=\{(pk, c_{0}, c_{1})$ : $c_{0}=\mathcal{E}_{pk}(m_{0})$ , $c_{1}=\mathcal{E}_{pk}(m_{1})$
for some $m_{0}$ , $m_{1}\in M_{k}$ such that $m_{0}\neq m_{1}$ and $|m0|=|m_{1}|$ and
for some $pk\in supp(\mathcal{K}(1^{k}))\}$ .
We denote $D\circ\cup D_{1}$ by $D$ . Adistinguishing ciphertexts problem is apromise problem1 $(D, D_{0})$ .
Then, it is easy to see that $D$ , $D_{0}$ , $D_{1}\in \mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$ .
Under CCA2, decryption oracle of type $\alpha$ replies with only the membership of $C$ . The
power of $\alpha$-CCA2depends deeply on the computational complexity of the ciphertext space $C$ .
In the original setting of CCA2, there are two stages. The first stage is before achallenge
ciphertext is given. The second stage is after the challenge ciphertext is given. Because of the
restriction of the adversary in the second stage, the treatment of the adversary is not uniform.
The non-uniformity precludes us from considering the PKE schemes secure against CCA2 from
the complexity theoretic viewpoint. However, as we have seen, the definition of $\alpha$-CCA2enables
us to consider the adversary uniformly. So, we have some relations between the complexity class
of the ciphertext space and security notions for PKE schemes.
Theorem 3Suppose that $\Pi$ is a $PKE$ scheme whose ciphertext space $C$ is in P. Then, the
following statements are equivalent
1. $\Pi$ is secure against CPA.
2. II is secure against a-CCA.
3. II is secure against Ox-CCA2,
Proof: The proof is straightforward, since if $C\in \mathrm{P}$ then decryption oracle of type $\alpha$ can be
easily simulated in polynomial time. $\square$
The above theorem says that $\alpha$-CCA2attack on any PKE scheme whose ciphertext space is
in $\mathrm{P}$ is not so powerful. In other words, if the PKE scheme whose ciphertext space is in $\mathrm{P}$ is
not secure against $\alpha$-CCA2, then the PKE scheme is not secure against CPA, either.
Theorem 4Suppose that $\Pi$ is a $PKE$ scheme whose ciphertext space $C$ is $\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$ -complete $w.r.t$.
truth-table reduction. Then $\Pi$ cannot achieve the security of IND-a-CCA2.
1A promise problem $(A, B)$ is aproblem to decide whether $x\in B$ or not when $x\in A$ . If $x\not\in A$ then we do not
care the answer. We call $A$ the promise of the promise problem. (For details about promise problem, see, e.g.
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Proof: Since $D_{0}\in \mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$ , there exists atruth-table reduction from $D_{0}$ to $C$ . Then decryption
oracle of type $\alpha$ helps to solve $D_{0}$ efficiently. This implies that the existence of asuccessful
adversary in the sense of $\mathrm{I}\mathrm{N}\mathrm{D}-\alpha$-CCA2. $\square$
We note that $\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$-completeness is usually defined in terms of many-0ne reduction. On the
other hand, truth-table reduction is weaker reduction than many-0ne reduction. So, if $A$ is NP-
complete w.r.t. many-0ne reduction, then $A$ is also $\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$-complete w.r.t. truth-table reduction.
(See, e.g., [20] for details about truth-table reduction.) We also note that it is not known
whether, in $\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$ , many-0ne reduction is properly stronger than truth-table reduction or not.
Corollary 5Suppose that $\Pi$ is a $PKE$ scheme whose ciphertext space $C$ is $\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$ -complete $w.r.t$.
tmth-table reduction. Then $\Pi$ cannot achieve the security of IND-/3-CCA2.
Suppose that $\Pi$ is aPKE scheme whose ciphertext space $C$ is $\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$-complete w.r.t. truth-
table reduction. Then, $\Pi$ cannot have the IC property, because the IC property requires that
$C\in \mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}\cap \mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$ . Thus, Theorem 4and Corollary 5say nothing about the security of PKE
schemes with the IC property.
Next, we assume that $C$ belongs to an intermediate complexity class $\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}\cap \mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$ . Let
us review acomplexity result concerned with security under $\alpha$-CCA for aPKE scheme whose
ciphertext space belongs to $\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}\cap \mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$.
Proposition 6[21] $\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}=\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}\cap \mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}}$
Since $D_{0}\in \mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$ , the above proposition apparently says that if $C\in \mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}\cap \mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$ then $\alpha$-CCA is
not so powerful. However, it depends on the difficulty of $D_{0}$ whether $\alpha$-CCA helps to solve $D_{0}$
or not.
4Relations
In this section, we consider relations among security notions more finely.
First, we mention trivial relations with respect to newly introduced chosen ciphertext attack.
Theorem 7Let $\Pi$ be a $PKE$ scheme. For any GOAL in $\{IND, NM\}$ , we have the following.
$\bullet$ If $\Pi$ is $GOAL-\gamma-$CCAl secure then $\Pi$ is GOAL-CCAl secure.
If $\Pi$ is GOAL 7-CCA1secure then $\Pi$ is GOAL -CCAl secure.
If $\Pi$ is GOAL-73-CCA1 secure then $\Pi$ is GOAL -CCAl secure.
If $\Pi$ is GOAL-a-CCAl secure then $\Pi$ is GOAL-CPA secure.. If $\Pi$ is GOAL -CCA2 secure then $\Pi$ is GOAL-CCA2 secure.
If $\Pi$ is $GOAL-\gamma-$CCA2 secure then $\Pi$ is GOAL -CCAl secure.
If $\Pi$ is GOAL-73-CCA2 secure then $\Pi$ is GOAL-a-CCA2 secure.
If $\Pi$ is $GOAL-\alpha$-CCA2secure then II is GOAL-CPA secure.
Theorem 8Let $\Pi$ be a $PKE$ scheme with the $IC$ prvperty. For any GOAL in $\{IND, NM\}$ ,
we have the following.
\bullet II is GOAL-fi-CCAl secure if and only if $\Pi$ is GOAL-CCAl secure.
\bullet $\Pi$ is GOAL -CCA2 secure if and only if $\Pi$ is GOAL-CCA2 secure.
The following theorem is shown as the proof in [1].
Theorem 9Let $\Pi$ be a $PKE$ scheme. If $\Pi$ is NM-ATK secure then $\Pi$ is also IND-ATK secure,
for $ATK\in$ {ce-CCAl, $\beta$-CCAI, $\gamma$-CCAI, $\alpha$-CCA2, $\beta$-CCA2,7-CCA2}.
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Next, we show several separation results. We define some property on message space. Mes-
sage space is said to be simple if there exists afunction 4: N $arrow M_{k}$ that is computable
in polynomial time and $\xi^{-1}$ is also computable in polynomial time. We call such afunction
ordering function.
Theorem 10 Suppose that there exists an IND-CPA $PKE$ scheme which has simple message
space. Then, IND-CPA and IND-a-CCA2 are separable.
Proof: (Sketch) Assume that there exists some IND-CPA PKE scheme $\Pi=(\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{E}, D)$ which has
simple message space, since otherwise the theorem is vacuously true. We now modify $\Pi$ to anew
PKE scheme $\Pi’=(\mathcal{K}’, \mathcal{E}’, D’)$ which is also IND-CPA secure but not secure in the IND-a-CCA2
sense. Let $M_{k}$ be asimple message space for $\Pi$ . The new PKE scheme $\Pi’=(\mathcal{K}’, \mathcal{E}’, D’)$ and the
new message space $M_{k}’$ for $\Pi’$ are defined as follows. Let $\leq \mathrm{b}\mathrm{e}$ the total order defined naturally
from the ordering function.
Algorithm $\mathcal{K}’(1^{k})$ :
$(pk, sk)arrow \mathcal{K}(1^{k})$ ; output $(pk, sk)$ .
Algorithm $\mathcal{E}_{pk}’(m_{0}||m_{1})$ , where $m_{0}\leq m_{1}$ :
$c_{0}arrow \mathcal{E}_{pk}(m_{0});c_{1}arrow \mathcal{E}_{pk}(m_{1})$ ;output $c_{0}||c_{1}$ .
Algorithm $D_{sk}’(c_{0}||c_{1})$ :
$m_{0}arrow D_{sk}(c_{0});m_{1}arrow D_{sk}(c_{1})$ ;
if $m_{0}\leq m_{1}$ then output $m_{0}$ else output $[perp]$ .
$M_{k}’arrow\{m_{0}||m_{1} : \mathrm{m}\mathrm{o},\mathrm{m}\mathrm{i}\in M_{k}, m_{0}\leq m_{1}\}$ .
First, we show that $\Pi’$ is not secure in the $\mathrm{I}\mathrm{N}\mathrm{D}-\alpha$-CCA2sense. Given aciphertext $c_{\mathrm{O}}||c_{1}$ , the
adversary $A=(A_{1}, A_{2})$ runs as follows: $A_{2}$ asks the decryption oracle of type $\alpha$ for $\mathcal{E}_{pk}(\xi(2^{i}))||c_{1}$ ,
where $i=0,1,2$ , $\ldots$ , until the oracle replies with “no”. Using this “binary method” , $A_{2}$ can
efficiently find $m_{0}$ such that $m_{0}=D_{sk}(c_{0})$ . Similarly $A_{2}$ can also find $m_{1}$ such that $m_{1}=D_{sk}(c_{1})$ .
Thus, it is not hard to see that the adversary $A$ can distinguish any ciphertexts.
Next, we show that $\Pi’$ is IND-CPA secure. We assume that $\Pi’$ is not IND-CPA secure.
That is, there exists adistinguisher $B=(B_{1}, B_{2})$ for $\Pi’$ . Now, we consider the following
algorithm $B’=(B_{1}’, B_{2}’)$ . $B_{1}’$ invokes $B_{1}$ and gets $(m_{0}||m_{0}’, m_{1}||m_{1}’, s)$ . $B_{1}’$ finally outputs
$(m_{0}, m_{1}, m_{0}’||m_{1}’||s)$ . Let $c=\mathcal{E}_{pk}(m_{b})$ for randomly chosen $b\in\{0,1\}$ . $B_{2}’$ invokes $B_{2}$ with input
$(m_{0}||m_{0}’, m_{1}||m_{1}’, s, c||d)$ where $c’=\mathcal{E}_{pk}(m_{d}’)$ for randomly chosen $d\in\{0,1\}$ . $B_{2}’$ obtains the
reply from $B_{2}$ and outputs the reply. It is not hard to see that $B’=$ ( $B_{1}’$ , By) is adistinguisher
of $\Pi$ . This is acontradiction. Thus we have that $\Pi’$ is IND-CPA secure. $\square$
In case of PKE schemes with the IC property, we have still asimilar result to Theorem 10.
Theorem 11 Suppose that there exists an IND-CPA $PKE$ scheme with the $IC$ property which
has simple message space. Then, in $PKE$ schemes with the $IC$ property, IND-CPA and IND-a-
$CCA\mathit{2}$ are separable.
Theorem 10 and Theorem 11 say that chosen ciphertext attack like Bleichenbacher’s [4] is
properly stronger than chosen plaintext attack.
Theorem 12 IND-a-CCA2 and $IND-\beta$-CCA2are separable.
Proof: (Sketch) Assume that there exists some IND-CPACCA2 PKE scheme $\Pi=(\mathcal{K},\mathcal{E}, D)$ ,
since otherwise the theorem is vacuously true. We now modify $\Pi$ to anew PKE scheme $\Pi’=$
$(\mathcal{K}’,\mathcal{E}’, D’)$ which is also IND-0-CCA2 secure but not secure in the $\mathrm{I}\mathrm{N}\mathrm{D}-\beta$-CCA2sense. Let $M_{k}$
be amessage space for $\Pi$ . The new PKE scheme $\Pi’=(\mathcal{K}’, \mathcal{E}’, D’)$ and the new message space
$M_{k}’$ for $\Pi’$ are defined as follows.
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Algorithm $\mathcal{K}’(1^{k})$ :
$(pk, sk)arrow \mathcal{K}(1^{k})$ ;output $(pk, sk)$ .
Algorithm $\mathcal{E}_{pk}’(m_{0}||m_{1})$ :
$c_{0}arrow \mathcal{E}_{pk}(m\mathrm{o});c_{1}arrow \mathcal{E}_{pk}(m_{1})$ ;output $\mathrm{q}||c_{1}$ .
Algorithm $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{y}_{sk(\mathrm{q}||c_{1}):}$
$m_{0}arrow D_{sk}(c\mathrm{o});m_{1}arrow D_{sk}(c_{1})$ ;output $m_{0}||m_{1}$ .
$M_{k}’arrow\{m_{0}||m_{1} : m_{0}, m_{1}\in M_{k}\}$ .
First, we show that $\Pi’$ is not secure in the IND-4CCA2 sense. Given aciphertext $c_{0}||c_{1}$ ,
the adversary $A=(A_{1}, A_{2})$ runs as follows: A2 asks the decryption oracle of type $\beta$ for $c_{1}||\mathrm{q}$).
Thus, it is not hard to see that the adversary $A$ can distinguish any ciphertexts.
Next, we show that $\Pi’$ is IND-CPACCA2 secure. We assume that $\Pi’$ is not $\mathrm{I}\mathrm{N}\mathrm{D}-\alpha$-CCA2
secure. That is, there exists adistinguisher $B=(B_{1}, B_{2})$ for $\Pi’$ . Now, we consider the fol-
lowing algorithm $B’=$ $(B_{1}’,B_{2}’)$ . $B_{1}’$ invokes $B_{1}$ and gets $(m\mathrm{o}||m_{0}’,m_{1}||m_{1}’, s)$ . We note that
$B_{1}’$ can deal with oracle query from $B_{1}$ using his own oracle invocation. $B_{1}’$ finally outputs
$(m_{0}, m_{1}, m_{0}’||m_{1}’||s)$ . Let $c=\mathcal{E}_{pk}(m_{b})$ for randomly chosen $b\in\{0,1\}$ . $B_{2}’$ invokes $B_{2}$ with input
$(m\mathrm{o}||m_{0}’,m_{1}||m_{1}’, s, c||d)$ where $d=\mathcal{E}_{pk}(m_{d}’)$ for randomly chosen $d\in\{0,1\}$ . $B_{2}’$ obtains the
reply from $B_{2}$ and outputs the reply. Again $B_{2}’$ can deal with oracle query from $B_{2}$ using his
own oracle invocation. It is not hard to see that $B’=(B_{1}’, B_{2}’)$ is adistinguisher of $\Pi$ . This is a
contradiction. Thus we have that $\Pi’$ is $\mathrm{I}\mathrm{N}\mathrm{D}-\alpha$-CCA2 secure. $\square$
As in the case of separation between IND-CPA and IND-a-CCA2, when we restrict on PKE
schemes with the IC property, separation between IND-a-CCA2 and $\mathrm{I}\mathrm{N}\mathrm{D}-\beta$-CCA2still holds.
Theorem 13 In $PKE$ schemes with the $ICp$ roperty, IND-a-CCA2 and $IND-\beta$-CCA2are sep-
arable.
Although chosen ciphertext attack like Bleichenbacher’s is properly stronger than chosen
plaintext attack, Theorem 12 and Theorem 13 say that chosen ciphertext attack like Bleichen-
bacher’s is properly weaker than general chosen ciphertext attack.
Theorem 14 Suppose that there exists an $IND-\beta$-CCA2 $PKE$ scheme which has simple message
space. Then IND-73-CCA2 and $IND$-CCA2are separable.
Proof: (Sketch) Assume that there exists some IND-4-CCA2 PKE scheme $\Pi=(\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{E}, D)$ which
has simple message space, since otherwise the theorem is vacuously true. We now modify II to
anew PKE scheme $\Pi’=(\mathcal{K}’,\mathcal{E}’, D’)$ which is also IND-4-CCA2 secure but not secure in the
IND-CCA2 sense. Let $M_{k}$ be asimple message space for $\Pi$ . We assume that $|M_{k}|\geq 3$ without
loss of generality. The new PKE scheme $\Pi’=(\mathcal{K}’,\mathcal{E}’, \theta)$ and the new message space $M_{k}’$ for $\Pi’$
are defined as follows.
Algorithm $\mathcal{K}’(1^{k})$ :
$(pk, sk)arrow \mathcal{K}(1^{k})$;output $(pk, sk)$ .
Algorithm $\mathcal{E}_{pk}’(m)$ :
$c_{0}arrow \mathcal{E}_{pk}(m);c_{1}arrow \mathcal{E}_{pk}(\xi(1))$;output $c_{0}||c_{1}$ or $c_{1}||\mathrm{q}$) randomly.
Algorithm $U_{sk}(c_{0}||c_{1})$ :
$m_{0}arrow D_{sk}(c\mathrm{o});m_{1}arrow D_{sk}(c_{1})$ ;output $\max\{m_{0},m_{1}\}$ .
$M_{k}’arrow\{m:\xi^{-1}(m)\geq 2\}$ .
First, we show that $\Pi’$ is not secure in the IND-CCA2 sense. Given aciphertext $c_{0}||c_{1}$ , the
adversary $A=(A_{1}, A_{2})$ runs as follows: $A_{2}$ asks the decryption “algorithm” for $c_{0}||\mathcal{E}_{pk}(\xi(2))$
and $\mathcal{E}_{pk}(\xi(2))||c_{1}$ . Although either $c_{\mathrm{O}}||\mathcal{E}_{pk}(\xi(2))$ or $\mathcal{E}_{pk}(\xi(2))||c_{1}$ is not alegitimate ciphertext
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the decryption algorithm $D’$ still works for the non-ciphertext. Since, for any plaintext $m$ for
$\Pi’$ , $\xi^{-1}(m)\geq 2$ , the decryption algorithm $D’$ can calculate the corresponding plaintext. Thus,
the adversary $A$ can distinguish any ciphertexts.
Next, we show that $\Pi’$ is $\mathrm{I}\mathrm{N}\mathrm{D}-\beta$-CCA2secure. We assume that $\Pi’$ is not $\mathrm{I}\mathrm{N}\mathrm{D}-\beta$-CCA2
secure. That is, there exists adistinguisher $B=(\mathrm{B}[, B_{2})$ for $\Pi’$ . Now, we consider the following
algorithm $B’=(B_{1}’, B_{2}’)$ . $B_{1}’$ invokes $B_{1}$ and gets $(m_{0}, m_{1}, s)$ such that $\xi^{-1}(m_{0})\geq 2$ and
$\xi^{-1}(m_{1})\geq 2$ . We note that $B_{1}’$ can deal with oracle query from $B_{1}$ using his own oracle
invocation. $B_{1}’$ finally outputs $(m_{0}, m_{1}, s)$ . Let $c=\mathcal{E}_{pk}(m_{b})$ for randomly chosen $b\in\{0,1\}$ .
$B_{2}’$ invokes $B_{2}$ with input $(m_{0}, m_{1}, s, c)$ . $B_{2}’$ obtains the reply from $B_{2}$ and outputs the reply.
Again $B_{2}’$ can deal with oracle query from $B_{2}$ using his own oracle invocation. It is not hard to
see that $B’=(B_{1}’, B_{2}’)$ is adistinguisher of $\Pi$ . This is acontradiction. Thus we have that $\Pi’$ is
$\mathrm{I}\mathrm{N}\mathrm{D}-\beta$-CCA2secure. $\square$
The following two theorems are similarly shown as the proofs in [1].
Theorem 15 If a $PKE$ scheme $\Pi IND-\beta$ -CCA2secure then $\Pi$ is also $NM-\beta$-CCA2secure.
Theorem 16 If a $PKE$ scheme $\Pi$ IND- $f\mathit{3}$ -CCA2 secure then II is also NM-/3-CCA2 secure.
5Conclusion
In this paper, we refined the definitions of chosen ciphertext attack and discussed the power of
chosen ciphertext attack more precisely. Though Bellare et a7 [1] showed the relation among
security notions for public-key encryption, we refined the relation according to newly defined
chosen ciphertext attack. We also gave some characterization of chosen ciphertext attack from
the viewpoint of computational complexity theory. These results contribute to the understanding
of chosen ciphertext attack and security for PKE schemes under CCA. Especially, we showed
that the “invalidity checkable” property of the decryption algorithm plays an important role to
determine the security of PKE schemes.
Though we worked out some relations among security notions for PKE schemes, the whole
relations among relations have not been accomplished yet. If relations to $\alpha$-CCAI, $\beta$-CCAI
and $\gamma$-CCAI are clarified, the understanding of security for PKE schemes under CCA will be
improved further.
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